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Abstract
It is widely perceived that credit conditions for U.K. consumers, particularly in the mortgage
market, have been radically liberalised since the 1970s. The implications for the housing
market and consumer spending are important. We examine quarterly micro-data from the
Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML) to learn about changes in credit conditions from loan-to-
value and loan-to-income ratios of first-time buyers (classified by region and age).  We
combine data on the proportions of high loan-to-value and loan-to-income loans with
aggregate information on U.K. consumer credit and mortgage debt to give 10 series for 1975-
2000.  We model these data in a ten-equation system, controlling for a comprehensive set of
economic and demographic influences on the demand and supply for credit, and extract a
single time-varying index of non-price credit conditions. The broad coverage of credit market
indicators and thorough investigation of economic forces driving the credit market should
make the resulting Credit Conditions Index more robust than previous estimates. The index
increases in the 1980s, peaking towards the end of the decade. It retraces part of this rise in
the early 1990s, before increasing again to levels apparently exceeding the previous peak.
The index will be useful in modelling consumption and the housing market, and in
interpreting current monetary conditions.
JEL classification: C32, E44, E51, G21.4
1.  Introduction
It is widely perceived that credit conditions for UK consumers, particularly in the mortgage
market, have been radically liberalised since the 1970s.  The implications for the housing
market and consumer spending have been important.  For example, the evidence is that
consumption and the housing market were the principal agencies in the economic boom of
the late 1980s and the subsequent recession of the early 1990s.  More specifically, changes in
credit availability during the 1980s and early 1990s are likely to have contributed to the boom
and subsequent retrenchment in consumption.
The need for a credit-conditions index (CCI), which measures the non-price aspect of credit
availability, has been widely recognised in the consumption literature.  Indeed, proxies such
as unsecured credit to income ratios and interest rate spreads have been used in empirical
work (see Bayoumi, 1993a,b and Sarno and Taylor, 1998 as examples of the former; and
Scott, 1996, for the latter).  However, such proxies are unsatisfactory because they are too
dependent on interest rates, asset prices, incomes, expectations and other aspects of the
economic environment. The key aim of the present paper is to construct a CCI, which, as far
as possible, is free of this endogeneity criticism because it controls for the effects of the
economic environment.
A first attempt in this direction was made by Muellbauer and Murphy (1993), in their ‘flib’
index, based on the analysis of average loan-to-value ratios (LVRs) in the U.K. for first-time
buyers from the 5 percent sample of Building Society mortgages
1.  For many of these buyers,
the LVRs are at ceilings set by mortgage lenders.  Effectively the method involved regressing
the log average LVR on the log of the mortgage interest rate, the log house price to income
ratio and the real mortgage interest rate, for 1969-1980 data, and using the post-1980
residuals as a measure of the easing of credit conditions due to financial liberalisation.
Caporale and Williams (2001) and Fernandez-Corugedo and Price (2002) have extended the
method to more recent data and have applied it to modelling consumption. However, the
method is somewhat fragile since it relies on a single indicator, and plausible changes in the
specification of the relationship can cause notable changes in the implied ‘flib’ estimates.
Muellbauer (1997) used annual regional data for first-time buyers on average LVRs and on
the proportion of LVRs over 0.9 to bring additional information to bear, using dummies to
trace out the post-1980 easing of mortgage credit.  As he acknowledges, see also Muellbauer
(2002), there is a sample selection problem in relying on a sample which before 1992
contained only building societies. Thus, when the banks aggressively entered the mortgage
market, loan terms offered by building societies became much less representative of the
market as a whole.
From 1975 to 2001, there are over a million observations on mortgages for first-time buyers
in the Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML), and in its predecessor before 1992, the 5 percent
Sample of Building Society Mortgages.  We extract quarterly data on loan and household
characteristics from this source, excluding sitting tenants and others buying at a price
discount. The present paper uses quarterly data on distributions of LVRs and also loan-to-
income ratios (LIRs), with a regional and age split, and combines these with aggregate data
                                                       
1  LVRs have also been used in studies of mortgage default as an indicator of lending quality,
see Breedon and Joyce(1992), Brookes, Dicks and Pradhan(1994).  Lending quality and ‘ease
of credit’ tend to be negatively related, though better screening of individuals’ credit histories
and other characteristics could improve quality and access to credit.5
on mortgage and non-mortgage household debt to generate time series data for 1975Q1 to
2001Q4 on ten credit indicators.  These are modelled in a ten-equation system with extensive
economic controls, and a common factor, the Credit Conditions Index, is extracted. The
common factor restriction is also used to model the effects of uncertainty for the debt market
environment, using a wide range of uncertainty proxies.  Since the aggregate data are not
subject to sample selection problems, we can use them to identify sample selection factors for
the micro data.
The broad coverage of credit market indicators and the thorough and comprehensive
investigation of economic forces driving the credit market should make the resulting index
more robust than previous estimates.  The economic variables we control or check for include
survey based consumer confidence measures, unemployment rates, demography, measures of
inflation and interest rate volatility, asymmetric rate of return measures for the housing
market, recent history of mortgage possessions rates, yield gaps to reflect interest rate
expectations, one year ahead income growth to reflect income expectations, as well as the
more conventional interest rate, wealth and income effects. We use the term ‘Credit
Conditions Index’ rather than ‘Financial Liberalisation Index’ because of the latter’s
connotations of process, rather than outcome.  Nevertheless, the process of financial
deregulation and other changes in financial architecture, described in Section 2, have had an
important bearing on the credit availability outcome.  We return in the conclusions to the
question of whether our index solves the ‘endogeneity’ problem. As well as its use in
econometric modelling of consumption, debt and the housing market, our estimated index has
direct applicability in interpreting the current state of credit markets.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we examine the various aspects of
liberalisation and other changes in U.K. credit markets since the 1970s.  Section 3 discusses
the information content of the Survey of Mortgage Lenders and its predecessor.  It discusses
reasons why lenders use credit ceilings, such as limits on loan-to-income and loan-to-value
ratios.  The information we extract consists of the proportions, by age and region, of first-
time buyers with loan-to-income ratios of 2.5 or more and the corresponding proportions with
loan-to-value ratios of 0.9 or more. We outline the empirical methodology: by controlling for
economic and demographic influences on the demand for credit, we extract a single time-
varying index of credit conditions from these SML data, combined with data on aggregate
mortgage and unsecured consumer debt.  The remainder of Section 3 explains the various
economic influences on the proportions of high loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios just
defined.
Section 4 discusses the economic influences on unsecured and mortgage debt, in the context
of the previous literature.  Section 5 presents empirical estimates of the ten-equation system
assuming there are no interaction effects between the Credit Conditions Index and the other
economic variables.  Section 6 discusses possible interaction effects of this type and presents
estimates of the generalised model including interaction effects.  Section 7 concludes and
discusses possible applications of the Credit Conditions Index.  A data appendix provides
details of data construction and sources.
2.  Financial liberalisation in the U.K.6
The 1970s in the U.K. saw a period of negative, after-tax real interest rates. The authorities
attempted to control credit with stringent liquidity ratios on banks, special deposits (popularly
known as the ‘corset’), regulations on minimum deposits and maximum repayment periods
on hire purchase credit, and directives and persuasion aimed at building societies. There were
several key events in the evolution of financial liberalisation under the Thatcher government,
which came to power in 1979. First, exchange controls were removed in 1979, opening the
banking sector to greater foreign competition and giving domestic institutions access to the
developing Eurodollar markets.  This was an important step in integrating the U.K. into
international capital markets. The logical second step was to abolish the ‘corset’ on bank
lending and banks could enter the mortgage market from 1980.
Increased competition in the mortgage market led to the relaxation of rules on building
societies (e.g., their access to money markets) and the break-up in 1983 of the interest rate-
fixing cartel. The Building Societies Act (1986) formalised the relaxation of rules.
Fourth, a second phase of new entry into the mortgage market from 1985 was heralded by the
influx of centralised mortgage lenders without high street branches.
2
Fifth, the Basel I accords on capital adequacy ratios for banks agreed in 1988, gave mortgage
loans a preferred status, with a 50 percent risk weighting relative to other loans.  This may
have caused a further easing in an already quite liberal mortgage-lending regime in the U.K.
The first major demutualisation of a building society, that of Abbey National, occurred in
1989, demonstrating the new fluidity of the mortgage market. This was followed by a spate
of others over the next decade. By 1990, differences in the average loan or the average
income of borrowers between bank and building society customers had become relatively
insignificant.
After 1990, following the start of the mortgage possessions crisis, financial liberalisation was
partially reversed. The Building Society Commission increased prudential advice in 1991.
Mortgage indemnity insurers moved the terms of insurance policies sharply against mortgage
lenders, not just in pricing, but also in risk sharing. One symptom of the tougher conditions of
the early 1990s was the loss of market share of centralised mortgage lenders (with
substantially higher default rates than building societies).
The later 1990s saw another type of new entry - the  internet mortgage lenders – and
significant innovation in new products, such as fixed rate mortgages over longer terms and
‘flexible mortgages’.  The latter permit borrowers to repay loans more quickly, take payment
holidays or extend loans flexibly, as long as loan-to-value ratios remain within pre-set
bounds, see Munro et al (2001). The spate of special offers to new customers tended to
improve mortgage terms for those willing to undergo the inconvenience of re-mortgaging,
one symptom of the strength of competitive pressures, see Samuels (2001).
In 1998, a significant change in pricing behaviour by mortgage lenders occurred.  Following
the lead of the largest lender, the Halifax, lenders gave borrowers exemption from mortgage
indemnity insurance (which insures lenders against mortgage default) if loan-to-value ratios
were below 0.9.  This gave borrowers considerable incentives to reduce mortgages to below
this level.
                                                       
2  These included Allied Irish Bank, Credit Lyonnais and other foreign banks.7
Two aspects of this brief history are illustrated in Figure 1.  This shows the value share of
banks in mortgages outstanding, where Abbey National continues to be treated as a building
society after 1988. The rapid rise from 1980 is notable, but after 1990, this share has little
more meaning as a sign of competitive pressure.  Figure 1 also shows the value share of
centralised mortgage lenders, demonstrating the post 1985 rise (see the left axis for the scale).
Figure 2 shows consumption to income and house price to income ratios rising strongly in the
1980s. Part of the co-movement is almost certainly due to the liberalisation of credit markets,
rather than the causal effect of house prices on consumption. Figure 3 shows the mortgage
debt and unsecured debt to income ratios, both more than doubling between 1980 and 1990,
and rising to new heights in recent years.
Another type of evidence is available from surveys of mortgage lenders, which have been
regularly carried out since the end of 1968:  As noted in the Introduction, the data on loan-to-
income and loan-to-value ratios for first-time buyers, will often represent ceilings set by
mortgage lenders.  We turn next to further use of data from this source.
3. Extracting information on credit conditions from the Survey
of Mortgage Lenders
3.1 Ceilings and the distributions of loan-to-income and loan-to-value
ratios
The key reason for mortgage lenders applying ceilings to loan-to-income and loan-to-value
ratios is to avoid the risk of default, both in payment arrears, and, more seriously, mortgage
possession. Consider the immediate causes of mortgage possession. Such default can be seen
as the intersection of two events: the ‘debt/equity ratio rising above some threshold’ and ‘a
trigger function (of debt service ratio, income shocks, house price shocks) exceeding another
threshold’.  The first of these events makes it difficult or impossible for the borrower to trade
down to cheaper housing or out into the rental sector, given the difficulty of obtaining
substantial unsecured debt.  In the absence of unexpected income losses or unexpected rises
in interest rates, mortgagors and lenders have an interest in avoiding default, even with a bad
debt/equity ratio, since mortgage possession in the U.K. is extremely unpleasant for
borrowers.  The latter are liable for the lenders’ transactions costs, pursuit in the courts for
years and denial of access to future credit.  However, if unexpected cash flow problems arise
- the trigger function exceeding some threshold, there will often be no alternative to default.
Formally, the probability of default equals the probability of a bad debt/equity ratio
multiplied by the probability of a bad trigger, given a bad debt/equity ratio.
3  By limiting the
                                                       
3   The U.K. differs in important ways from many U.S. states, where borrowers’ liabilities end as
soon as they return the keys to the mortgaged property to the lender.  This means that in the
U.S. the first factor, the debt/equity ratio should have a more dominant role in defaults,
largely decided on by borrowers. Thus the U.S. ‘rational default model’, which applies option
pricing theory to find bad debt/equity threshold, in absence of transactions costs and credit
restrictions, is unlikely to apply in the U.K., where most defaults were instigated by lenders,8
initial loan-to-value ratio, lenders can reduce the probability of a later bad debt-equity ratio,
which can arise through a fall in house prices, and/or through accumulated payment arrears.
By limiting initial loan-to-income ratios, the probability of a later bad ‘trigger’ is reduced.
For example, with a loan-to-value of 2.5, the initial debt service ratio is 2.5*r, where r is the
tax-adjusted mortgage interest rate plus pro-rated loan repayments, initially a small fraction
of monthly mortgage payments, plus pro-rated insurance costs.  For example, with r at 10
percent, 25 percent of income is committed to debt service.  However, with r at 15 percent,
37.5 percent of income would be committed to debt service, a percentage many households
would find hard to tolerate, particularly if they had not planned for it.  Thus, in an
environment of high nominal interest rates, lenders are likely to apply tighter loan-to-income
criteria, while in a low interest rate environment of, for example, 2001-2, the opposite will be
the case.
For given interest rates, house prices etc., financial liberalisation as occurred in the U.K. in
the 1980s, is likely to have raised both types of loan ceilings.  Note that, while borrowers and
lenders have significant common interests in wanting to avoid loan defaults or coming under
severe financial pressure from debt service costs, there seems no reason why financial
liberalisation should cause borrowers to want to raise these ceilings.
4  The rise in loan-to-
income and loan-to-value ceilings, which occurred, and which cannot be explained by
conventional demand side variables, is therefore likely to have been a shift on the credit
supply-side.
The structure of decision-making behind the observable LIRs and LVRs, has been discussed
by Muellbauer (1997).  A credit-unconstrained household chooses a mortgage loan M
d and a
house of value V
d by maximizing utility subject to their budget constraint and the housing
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not borrowers.  Unpublished research on arrears and possessions for a large mortgage lender
in the U.K. (Cameron, Hendry and Muellbauer) provides evidence consistent with these
points.
4  Whilst we make the point that financial liberalisation should not lead to an increase in the
ceilings chosen by borrowers, habit formation may suggest the contrary. With financial
liberalisation, the consumption of housing goods increased in the economy as agents were
able to borrow to purchase a house.  As the consumption of housing goods increased,
individuals falling behind would have come under reference group pressure to ‘keep up with
the Joneses’ and so increase their housing consumption and debt levels.  However, note that
the story begins with financial liberalisation.  It certainly seems plausible that the diffusion
process by which it affected behaviour could have been via consumer habits as well as their
and the lenders’ information sets.  These channels cannot be empirically distinguished in our
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d* is obtained by re-maximizing utility subject to the LIR < LIR
s constraint.
Note that the outcome where both constraints bite, so that LVR = LVR
s and LIR =LIR
s, is a
possibility subsumed under (b) and (c).  Then  V/Y = LIR
s/LVR
s
This is the decision making structure underlying data on the observed distributions of LVRs
and LIRs.  We cannot observe the LVR
s and LIR
s ceilings directly. Clearly they vary to some
extent over lenders and certainly vary with time.
3.2 The empirical methodology
We use 25 years of quarterly data on mortgage credit conditions from the Survey of
Mortgage Lenders (SML) and, as noted, its predecessor
5.  Specifically, we examine
distributions of loan-to-value (LVR) and loan-to-income (LIR) for first-time buyers (FTBs),
concentrating particularly on vulnerable tails for LVR > 0.9 and LIR > 2.5.  We examine data
by age (under 27/27+) and by region (North/South) giving 8 series on the proportion of FTBs
in these respective vulnerable tails.  By including also aggregate data on mortgage
debt/income and unsecured consumer credit/income, illustrated in Figure 3, we have  10
series. We then use economic and demographic variables to control for variations in credit
demand, and a spline function is used to measure the common unobserved supply side
component, our Credit Conditions Index, over the last 25 years.  Such an index can then be
used to model consumption, house prices, housing turnover and subsequent loan defaults in
separate equations.  Alternatively, such equations could be added by extending the 10-
equation system to 12 or more equations, for example, by modelling the consumption and
house price data illustrated in Figure 2.
Usable electronic records for the LIR and LVR distributions begin in 1975 but average loan-
to-income and loan-to-value ratios for first-time buyers (excluding discounted ‘right to buy’
sales to social housing tenants) are available back to 1969 and are illustrated in Figure 4.  The
loan-to-income graph shows an early peak in 1972 during the first of the post-war house price
booms, a strong rise between 1980 and 1990, and a weaker upward drift in more recent years.
Despite some definitional issues, to be discussed, the data suggest a considerable positive
correlation between average house price/income ratios and loan-to-income ratios.
6 The graph
of the average loan-to-value ratio suggests the opposite correlation with average house
price/income ratios, and a strong rise between 1980 and 1984, with levels thereafter
remaining higher than before, but otherwise no immediately obvious pattern emerging.
                                                       
5  The survey and its predecessor consisted of a 5 percent sample until 2000.  The survey
includes information on income, size of loan, value of house being purchased, previous
tenure, the age of the main borrower, whether the price was discounted, type and duration of
mortgage, and the interest rate charged.  From 1980, single borrowers and multiple borrowers,
such as couples, are distinguished, but not so in earlier years.
6  They also contain at least a hint that the temporary early 1970s "Competition and Credit
Control” policy shift by the Bank of England was associated with some easing of credit
market conditions.10
Figures 5 and 6 show PLIR, the percentage of FTBs with loan-to-income ratios of 2.5 or
more by age and region, rising from under 10 percent in 1980 to over 60 percent in 1989 in
the case of the South and to over 35 percent in North.  The correlation with average house
price to income ratios is apparent as in Figure 4: both the 1989-90 peak and the early 1990s
decline in the South are consistent with the pronounced Southern boom/bust in house prices
in this period.  The systematic tendency of PLIR to be higher in the South than the North is
also consistent with higher house price/income ratios in the South.  Differences by age are
less pronounced than by region: older FTBs tend to have slightly lower percentages of high
LIR mortgages in both regions.
Figures 7 and 8 show PLVR, the percentage of FTBs with loan-to-value ratios of 0.9 or more.
The graphs show a very clear difference between borrowers aged under 27 and those aged
over 27: in both regions, systematically higher percentages of younger borrowers have LVRs
of 0.9 or more. One should expect such differences since younger borrowers tend to have
lower cash resources and so are less able to provide substantial deposits. For these younger
borrowers, PLVR rose from averages of 25-30 percent in 1975-80, to 60-80 percent and 50-
70 percent for North and South, respectively, for 1984-2000.  The decline since 1998 is
notable.
3.3 Economic factors impinging on PLIR
The structure of decision-making, involving both households and mortgage lenders,
underlying the observed LIR and LVR distributions was discussed in Section 3.1.  In many
respects mortgage lenders and households have the same interest in avoiding default.  The
direction of effects of interest rate and risk factors on the proportion of high LIR loans will
therefore be the same, whether they operate on LIR
s or LIR
d.  The directions of most of the
economic forces operating on the proportion of high LIR loans are easy to understand, see
Muellbauer (1997) for more microeconomic detail.
We now list the key economic variables and the signs of their expected effects on PLIR, the
percentage of FTBs with LIR > 2.5:
(-) Nominal interest rate: to avoid uncomfortably high debt service ratios, see Section
3.1, PLIR should fall as the nominal interest rate rises.
(-) Real interest rate: a high real rate raises the probability of mortgage arrears and lower
house prices.
(-) Interest rate expectations: the yield gap between gilts at durations of one or more
years and short rates, should reflect the market view of the direction of movement of
short rates.
(+) House price/ income ratio: a high ratio puts pressure on borrowers to get the highest
possible loan (and so helps explain higher PLIR in South).
(+) Consumer confidence: greater confidence in economic prospects should increase the
willingness of lenders to lend and borrowers to borrow.11
(-) Perceived risk: we use four indicators.  The first two are inflation and interest rate
volatility.  Greater historical volatility is likely to be interpreted, by lenders and
borrowers, as a sign of greater riskiness and should discourage borrowing on high
multiples.  The third risk indicator is an asymmetric indicator
7 of returns on housing
and the fourth is the rate of mortgage possessions, in the form of two or three year
moving averages.
(-) The change in unemployment: a rise in unemployment is an indicator of the risk of
income declines.
(+) Expected income growth: using actual income growth over the next 4 quarters as a
proxy.
(-) Cut in ISMI (income support for mortgage interest): in 1995 such income support was
sharply reduced, increasing the risk of cash flow problems in the event of
unemployment.
(-) Share of couples: since lenders apply lower LIR ceilings to joint incomes, a rise in the
share of couples among first-time buyers, would lower the proportion of high LIR
loans.
(-) Sample selection: before 1990, when the survey refers to building societies only, an
increase in the share of banks, and later, in centralised mortgage lenders, makes the
building society sample a more distorted representation of the whole market.  We
represent the first effect by weighting the 4-quarter change in the share of banks in
mortgages outstanding by the average loan to FTBs by banks minus the average loan
to FTBs by building societies, scaled by the average loan to FTBs by building
societies.  When banks first entered the market, they catered to the upper end,
particularly of existing bank customers with stable jobs and known credit and income
records, driving the building societies down-market, where loan-to-income ratios
were lower but loan-to-value ratios were higher.  By the late 1980s, the average loans
from banks and building societies had become fairly similar, so that the sample
selection effect would have been much lower.   The evidence is that centralised
mortgage lenders catered to the riskier end of the market, so that their entry would
have pushed down PLIR and PLVR reported by building societies.
8
3.4 Economic factors impinging on PLVR
One would expect the economic factors acting on PLVR, the percentage of FTBs with loan-
to-value ratios of 0.9 or more, to work similarly to those acting on PLIR, with the following
exceptions:
                                                       
7  This indicator is defined as the rate of return when this is negative and zero when the rate of
return is positive.
8  Note that the information from aggregate mortgage debt data is helpful for identifying such
sample selection effects. While the centralised mortgage lenders are gaining market share,
this is reflected in rising aggregate mortgage debt/income ratios - even though the building
society data on PLIR and PLVR apparently suggests no rise or even a contraction of credit
conditions.12
(-) Nominal interest rate: though the effect on PLVR is still likely to be negative, it
should be weaker than the effect on PLIR, which stems directly from the definition of
the debt-service ratio.
(-) House price to income ratio: this should act on PLVR in the opposite direction to the
effect on PLIR.  There are two mechanisms: a high house price indicates a greater
probability of a fall in house prices, other things being equal. Second, in areas with
high house price/income ratios, households are more likely constrained by LIR
ceilings than by LVR ceilings.  Since the risks in the two dimensions interact, as
noted in Section 3.1, lenders should be more cautious about offering very high LVRs
to borrowers already at LIR ceilings.
(-) Rate of change of house prices: valuations by surveyors for mortgage lenders are
likely to be conservative, tending to lag behind the market when prices are rising
strongly.  Loan offers are based on these valuations but loan-to-values reported for
completed transactions are based on prices actually paid, which will tend to exceed
mortgage valuations in rising markets.  The time lag in the mortgage approvals
process can induce similar effect in rising markets, where the incidence of
‘gazumping’ - the seller demanding a higher price than initially agreed - is higher.
Note that this effect should be absent from the PLIR equation.
(-) ‘Pricing’ mortgage indemnity premia: in 1998, Halifax removed mortgage indemnity
premia for LVR < 0.9 and the market followed.  This gave borrowers an incentive to
bring LVRs below 0.9, e.g. by increasing unsecured borrowing to raise cash deposits.
(-) Increased access to unsecured lending: by the route just outlined.
(-) Average age: though we divide borrowers into under 27, and 27 and over, age groups,
variations do occur of average ages within these groups, e.g. an upward drift in the
1990s.  Since the accumulation of financial assets available as a housing deposit
increases with age, we expect a negative effect on PLVR
9.
(?) Sample selection with respect to the rising share of banks: there are likely to be two
offsetting forces at work.  The first, with a negative influence on the proportion of
high LVR loans reported by building societies, comes from the simple fact that in
competing for similar customers, gains in market share by banks are likely to be the
result of more generous terms, viz. higher LVRs and LIRs.  This would mean the
proportion of high LVRs reported by building societies understates the proportion for
the market as a whole.  However, there is an effect in the opposite direction, which
comes from the fact that the building societies were forced downmarket where LVRs
tend to be higher.  Note that this offsetting effect is not present for LIRs, since LIRs
tend to be lower for lower income borrowers.
3.5 Functional forms for PLIR and PLVR equations
                                                       
9  One would expect a negative effect on PLIR also.  However, given the stylised fact from
Figures 4 and 5, of only a small age difference in PLIR between the under 27 and 27+ groups,
it seems likely that this effect will be weak.13
Section 3.1 set out the decision structure behind the observed LIRs and LVRs.  We do not







and about the stochastic structure of disturbances at the level of individual households and
mortgage lenders.  Identification of these structural relationships is hopeless.  Moreover, the
observed distribution of LIRs and LVRs is for completed transactions of first-time buyers.
Some may not have been able to obtain finance at all, or have been unsuccessful in housing
search, or to have encountered sellers unable to transact within the relevant period.  We know
that the number of transactions by first-time buyers has fluctuated considerably over the last
25 years, see Holmans (1996, 2001) and it is possible that the shape of the LIR and LVR
distributions may have been affected by the transactions volume.  However, as indicated
above, we use an extremely rich set of controls effectively to model reduced form equations
for PLIR and PLVR.
Suppose reduced forms for observed LIRs and LVRs at the individual level are given by
it log LIR() tit fx e =+ (3.1)
it ly LVR() tit gx h =+ (3.2)
where ei and hi are household specific error terms with zero means.
Then
t PLIR(() log 2.5) tit Pfx e =+‡ (3.3)
and
t PLVR(()log 0.9) tit Pgx h =+‡ (3.4)














exp()(1)/ ttt zPP a =-
and
log(/1) ttt PPz a -=- (3.6)
This suggests using the log odds ratios log(PLIR/1-PLIR) and (PLVR/1-PLVR), as the
dependent variables.  As we shall see, we allow for a possible mis-specification of eq. 3. 6 by
introducing a cubic in zt as well.14
4. Economic factors impinging on aggregate unsecured and
mortgage debt to income ratios
One would expect the economic variables affecting debt to income ratios to work in the
following direction:
(+) Demography: proportions of working age individuals in the key house buying age
groups
(+)  Income: higher income should allow individuals to be able to service a given amount
of debt more easily.
10
(+) Expected income growth: if individuals are consumption smoothers and expect higher
income growth in the future, they will increase their consumption of housing and non-
housing goods for a given level of income and will therefore be more likely to get into
debt.
(-) The change in the unemployment rate: this variable may proxy income uncertainty. A
higher unemployment rate is consonant with higher uncertainty leading to higher
savings for precautionary reasons.
11 Moreover, higher unemployment is likely to lead
to lower current and expected aggregate labour income, leading to a reduction in
consumption.
(-) Liquid financial wealth: at the individual level, greater liquid wealth reduces the need
to borrow.  At the level of the economy, a higher level of household liquid
assets/income suggests a greater ability for the financial system to recycle assets into
debt, though with financial deregulation, household deposits would no longer
constrain lending to households. In other words, controlling for the Credit Conditions
Index, greater liquid wealth should reduce indebtedness.
(+) Illiquid financial wealth, e.g. tied up in pensions, provides long-term asset backing for
debt, and so should have a positive effect on the demand for debt.
(+) Housing wealth: the greater gross housing wealth, the greater the available collateral
for mortgage debt.
(+) Consumer confidence: the measure of consumer confidence used in our work
corresponds to the GfK survey and measures consumers’ confidence about their
finances and the state of the economy. An increase in confidence should be consonant
with better prospects for the economy.
(-)   Change in consumer credit controls: consumer credit controls, which regulated down-
payments and repayment periods for ‘hire purchase’ borrowing to buy durable goods,
were an important policy instrument in the 1950s to 1970s.  A tightening in controls
                                                       
10  See Ludvigson (1999) for a theoretical model of unsecured debt as a function of consumers’
income.  In that model an increase in the debt to income ceiling enables consumers to get into
more debt, a fact Ludvigson finds consistent with the data.  Also see Japelli (1990) for the
finding that a major reason households in the Survey of Consumer Finances are denied credit
is because they had insufficient income.
11  See Carroll and Dunn (1997) for forceful arguments that unemployment expectations are a
good predictor of consumption.15
should have a negative impact on unsecured debt in the 1970s, in addition to its role
as a proxy for CCI at this time.
(-)       Stock of debt in the previous period/income: the higher is debt, the more debt has to be
repaid each period under typical debt contracts.  Another aspect is equilibrium
correction: the tendency of the steady state level of debt not to be exceeded.
 (-) Nominal interest rate: as we saw in section 3, a higher nominal interest rate and so
debt service ratio is likely to reduce the amount of debt that individuals are likely to
undertake and to which lenders will agree.
(-)  Real interest rate: a higher real interest rate should lower debt through two channels.
In the first, a higher interest rate will increase the debt service ratio making debt less
affordable. The second channel is through saving since a higher real interest rate
increases the price of current consumption.
(-/+) Spreads between the credit card interest rate and mortgage rate: a negative effect on
unsecured debt; a positive effect on mortgage debt
(-) Perceived risk: we use the four indicators discussed in Section 3.3.
(-) Cut in ISMI (income support for mortgage interest): the increase in the risk of future
cash flow problems should reduce demand at the margins.
(+) Ratio of credit cards outstanding to adult population: a positive effect on unsecured
credit. The more credit cards available to consumers the higher the probability that
these will be used.
(+) Mortgage indemnity premium pricing dummy: a positive effect on unsecured credit
from 1998 as lenders abolished the premium for LVRs under 0.9; a corresponding
negative effect on mortgage debt, but proportionately smaller.
5.   Empirical results: the base-line model
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 have outlined the economic variables impacting on loan-to-income and
loan-to-value ratios for first-time buyers, as represented by the eight series on PLIR and
PLVR, and on aggregate unsecured and mortgage debt to income ratios.  As explained in
Section 3.2, the effect of the altered credit supply environment, linked to the institutional
changes discussed in Section 2, is introduced in each equation through the Credit Conditions
Index, CCI, common to all ten equations.  This is represented by a linear spline function,
which apart from 1980s, consists of connected straight-line segments, which can change
slope at the beginning of each year.  The CCI also depends on the change in consumer credit
controls, phased out in 1983.  In addition, in the unsecured debt equation, we incorporate the
ratio of the number of credit cards outstanding to the number of adults, to capture changes in
credit supply not reflected in CCI, the latter being more tuned to the mortgage market.
The data appendix gives details of data construction (e.g., of tax-adjusted interest rates, after-
tax disposable non-property income, and the use of annual data from the New Earnings16
Survey on earnings by age, gender and region, interpolated using the quarterly average
earnings index to obtain income data by age and region
12).
Even without the interaction effects discussed in Section 6, estimating this 10-equation
system was not trivial: we imposed our extensive prior expectations on sign patterns of
coefficients outlined in Sections 3.2-3.4, as well as on the broad outline of the CCI index,
given the institutional evolution described in Section 2. Moreover, to the extent practicable,
we allowed the lag structures (e.g., of responses to interest rates and house price changes) to
be determined empirically.  The priors were extremely helpful in reducing very flexible
general specifications to a parsimonious one.
We now explain schematically the set-up of the 10-equation system and some identification
issues.  We write the equations in the form:
?yit  = ai (?i CCIt  + µiVOLt  + Sßijxjt – yit-1)  + eit                                                                           (5.1)
for i=1,10
CCI = S ds Dumst + ?1?4CCt + ?2 liqrt-1                                                                    (5.2)
VOL = S ?jzjt                                                                                                                                                               (5.3)
The y variables in (5.1) are the two log debt measures and the eight log odds-ratios of LVRs
and  LIRs exceeding given threshold values, by region and age. We model each as an
equilibrium correction model, with the dependent variable in quarterly change form, Dy. Here
ai is the speed of adjustment.  For the xjt, which can be given a long-run interpretation, bj is
the long-run coefficient. Note that the x’s include variables in D form, and so not in the long-
run solution.  We also impose some homogeneity across equations, for example, setting most
slope coefficients to be the same across regions and age for the four PLVR equations and the
four PLIR equations, respectively.
The definition of the credit conditions index CCI given in (5.2) incorporates split trends, the
Dums, the 4-quarter change in consumer credit controls, ?4CC and  liqr, defined as the
liquidity ratio of building societies before 1980Q3 minus its 1980Q4 value, and zero
thereafter.  The definition of VOL incorporates measures of inflation volatility, interest rate
volatility and the rate of mortgage possessions.
It is clear that the ai and therefore the ßij  are identified in (5.1).  However, a scalar multiple of
the coefficients in (5.2) cannot be separated from a similar multiple of ?i , so that either one
of the coefficients in (5.2) or one of the ?i  has to be normalised at some value.  Exactly the
same applies to µi and the coefficients of (5.3).  We choose to set ?i=10 and µi=10, for the
PLIR equations.
5.1 The equation for unsecured debt.
                                                       
12  Such data could have been extracted from the SML but are likely to be too subject to sample
selection problems.  For example, if unemployment rises, the income profile of those selected
both by themselves and by lenders to be successful FTBs may well improve, as more risky
prospects are selected out, giving a spuriously positive impression of the economic
environment. 17
Previous research on the determination of unsecured household debt in the U.K. is relatively
sparse.
13 The most recent study is that of Chrystal and Mizen (2001), who examine a
simultaneous system including consumption, household M4 and unsecured credit using a
VECM approach.  Chrystal and Mizen identify 3 cointegrating vectors.  That for unsecured
lending has the form (Table C):
log ud/pc = 1.41 log real income - 0.68 (credit card interest rate - bank base rate)
 + 0.65 log real net worth - 2.89 dlog pc, (5.4)
where ud is unsecured debt and pc is the consumer expenditure deflator.  However, in the
context of the VAR, the Johansen cointegration approach finds empirically that the ECM
terms for consumption and broad money also enter the model for Dlog ud/pc with significant
coefficients, see their Table C.  In a model, which conditions on the growth rate of current
consumption and in current M4, the former enters negatively with a coefficient of –1.6
(t=3.5) and the latter positively with a coefficient of 3.9 (t=6.9), while the change in the
unemployment rate has a positive coefficient, 0.039 (t=4.5) and consumer confidence has a
significantly positive effect.  The ECM for log real ud itself enters with a coefficient of –0.11
(t=5.2), see their Table E.  It is clear that such an equation cannot be given a conventional
demand for credit interpretation: unsecured credit can only be understood as part of the
system.
Our approach is, in one sense, more conventional: unsecured credit is interpreted in terms of
a function of income, lagged assets, interest rates, consumer confidence etc., which, unlike
current consumption and money holdings, can plausibly be regarded as given to the
individual household.  Though at the micro level, asymmetric information is endemic, so that
lenders use rules to limit their risk exposure, information about macro aggregates should be
broadly symmetric between lenders and borrowers.  Data on unsecured credit will therefore
incorporate lending rules, as well as what credit demand could have been in the absence of
lending ceilings, both, in turn, reflecting the aggregate data on income, lagged assets etc. As
                                                       
13  At the level of theory, most of the research on unsecured debt has been undertaken with
respect to the effects that unsecured debt can have on consumption/saving decisions. See
Antzoulatos (1994), Scott (1996),  Ludvigson (1999), Carroll (2001),  Fernandez-Corugedo
(2002) for the theoretical effects of the relaxation of liquidity constraints on consumption
decisions.  The main result that comes from these papers is that with a relaxation of credit
ceilings individuals are able to increase their consumption for a given level of cash-on-hand.
However, such an increase in consumption reduces precautionary savings and therefore
makes individuals more exposed to uncertainty.  Maki (2000) provides an excellent summary
of some of the U.S. empirical literature on consumer credit and the household debt service
burden.  Recent papers include Murphy (1999), who demonstrates that the debt burden of
households is helpful in forecasting future consumption growth, and in particular durable
consumption growth.  Gross and Souleles (2001) examine credit demand and supply using US
credit card data.  They find that an increase in the credit limit leads to an immediate and
significant rise in debt.  Westaway (1990) considers a consumption model where a proportion
of individuals are able to finance part of their consumption expenditure using debt (both
secured and unsecured debt).  Westaway obtains mixed results on U.K. data. He finds that a
sensible long-run cointegrating vector does not exist between consumption and the variables
thought to determine it, but he also finds that a model, which includes debt, does perform
better than equations, which do not include debt.18
already noted, the distinctive feature of our approach is in the treatment of credit conditions
through the CCI measure.
The difficulties of modelling unsecured debt are considerable.  The first is that this is a far
from homogeneous category.  It includes hire purchase debt – in fact, often secured on the
value of a car or other expensive durable purchase.  The duration of such debt can be as long
as four years, and the interest rate can sometimes be discounted as part of a purchase
package.  It also includes personal bank loans, with not dissimilar durations.  Student loans,
however, tend to have longer durations.  These are the main types of closed-end loans. The
other important ingredients are in the nature of ‘revolving’ credit, with short durations. Maki
(2001) points out that, in the U.S., revolving credit has grown from around 1 percent of
personal disposable income in 1970 to around 8 percent in recent years, now accounting for
around 40 percent of total unsecured consumer credit.  It seems likely that much of this
growth is accounted for by the growth of credit card debt, the rest being largely bank
overdrafts up to pre-arranged ceilings. The second difficulty, that of measuring the relevant
interest rate, stems from the first.  Not only do interest rates differ by type of loan and by
lender, but much of credit card debt, where bills are fully paid off monthly, is interest free.
The third difficulty, measuring debt-service ratios, which add interest costs to repayment
rates, is related.  The Bank of England calculates ‘official’ estimates of debt service ratios,
excluding repayments of principle, but only for the last few years, see Financial Stability
Review, June 2002, p.82..  As Maki (2000) makes clear, the U.S. estimates are, in part, based
on crude assumptions such as that the minimum monthly payment on credit card debt is 2.5
percent of the outstanding debt, and on approximate data on the durations of closed-end
loans.
We model unsecured debt as an equilibrium correction model, with the dependent variable,
the log change of unsecured debt, Dlog ud.  We estimate the equation in the form (5.1), where
au is the speed of adjustment.  For the xjt, which can be given a long-run interpretation, bj is
the long-run coefficient. Note that the x’s include variables in D form, and so not in the long-
run solution.  The key component of the ECM, is the log ratio of ud(-1)/income. But the ECM
includes other levels effects:  log per capita real income, the log nominal interest rate,
14 the
real interest rate, interest rate spreads, the rate of return in housing, the log of the ratio of the
number of credit cards outstanding to the adult population, log ratios of liquid, illiquid
financial and housing assets to income, the proportion of the population in the 20-35 age
group, consumer confidence, and various risk indicators discussed above.  Dynamic terms
included the change in the unemployment rate and a measure of demographic change, which
weights age groups by their importance in mortgage borrowing.  Table 1a shows the base line
model estimated for 1976Q1 to 2000Q4.
The parameter estimates are consistent with almost all the sign priors stated in Section 4,
though some effects are insignificant.  The most important exception is that, while, as we
shall see, the mortgage interest rate has a strong negative effect in the mortgage equation, we
were never able to establish a negative effect for an interest rate for unsecured debt, measured
either with the credit card rate (from Barclays Bank) or with bank base rates, in the unsecured
debt equation.  Perhaps this is not surprising in view of the measurement problems described
                                                       
14  The repayment part of the debt service ratio is implicitly proxied by a constant proportion of
the lagged stock itself, already included in the equation.19
above.  The effect is therefore excluded
15. However, the interest spread as measured by the
credit card rate of Barclays Bank minus the tax-adjusted mortgage interest rate, is highly
significant in the unsecured debt equation.   Other features of this equation are the long-run
income elasticity of around 1.4, despite both the significant CCI effect and a significant effect
of the ratio of the number of credit cards outstanding to the adult population.  In contrast, the
long-run income elasticity is clearly one in the mortgage equation.  Expected income growth
has a significantly positive effect on unsecured debt, consistent with intertemporal
consumption smoothing, while the equivalent effect in the mortgage debt equation is
insignificant.
The asset effects suggest a negative coefficient for liquid assets, consistent with out prior.
The illiquid financial asset effect is positive, suggesting that the personal sector is more
willing to take on unsecured debt when its equity and pension investments are high.  The
housing wealth effect, however, is close to zero.  This may reflect the simple fact that
unsecured debt is non-mortgage debt: had housing security been available, the household
would have borrowed in the form of cheaper mortgage debt.
No seasonal dummies were significant, not surprising given consumer credit is seasonally
adjusted. A dummy consisting of 1 followed by -1 proxies the announcement of coming
windfalls from building society  demutualisations in 1997.  A more permanent change
occurred in early 1998, when, as discussed in section 3, mortgage lenders decided to exempt
mortgages with LVRs below 0.9 from mortgage indemnity insurance premia.  This created an
incentive, at the margin, to increase the unsecured component of borrowing and to reduce the
mortgage component.  According to our estimates, this raised the long-run stock of unsecured
credit by 8 percent.
The speed of adjustment is 0.27.  This suggests a relatively rapid speed of adjustment or short
average loan duration for unsecured borrowing.  Our composite indicator, VOL, of interest
rate risk and expectations, proxied respectively by recent volatility of inflation and the log of
the base rate, and by the yield gap between one-year gilts and base rate, is very significant.
This suggests that the climate of low inflation and the stable monetary policy framework of
recent years has encouraged borrowing.
The standard error of the equation is around one third of the Chrystal-Mizen unsecured debt
equation even after a degree of freedom adjustment, reflecting our richer specification, as
well as the use of the Credit Conditions Index.  The long-run effect of the latter can be
computed by taking its peak value of 0.235 in 2000, multiplying by its long-run coefficient of
2.15 to give 0.503.  The implication is that about 0.5 of the rise in the log of unsecured debt
from 1980 to 2000 can be attributed to the rise in the CCI.  This corresponds to a 65 percent
rise.
Tests for serial independence up to the 4th order and homoscedasticity of the residuals are all
satisfactory. A check on parameter stability is provided by the last two columns of Table 1a,
which shows the estimates over the 1975Q1 to 1990Q4 sample.  The standard error is higher
                                                       
15  Part of the problem may be in not having a good measure of the relevant interest rate on
unsecured debt, which is a mixture of credit card debt, bank loans and hire purchase loans.  A
large and variable part of credit card debt is effectively interest free, to those who pay off
their bills every month.  For those who do not, credit card rates differ across lenders by large
amounts.20
for the shorter sample and the great majority of the parameters are under two standard
deviations from the full-sample estimates.
5.2  The equation for mortgage debt
There is a large volume of previous research on the determination of the U.K. stock of
building society mortgages, but this peters out by the mid-1980s, as the entry of the banks
into the mortgage market made this both harder to model and less relevant.  Anderson and
Hendry (1984), Meen (1985) and Wilcox (1985) are the last significant studies.  Meen
reviews previous work comprehensively.  As he makes plain, all the previous studies took
into account that before 1980 mortgage demand had been in an almost continuous excess
demand state. Indeed, Meen estimates a measure of excess demand and so the severity of
mortgage rationing, MRAT to be the percentage deviation between the flow demand for
mortgages and the actual mortgage flow, which is positive for 1963Q1 to 1980Q3, before
turning positive.
Meen’s model does not give a long-run solution for mortgage demand, though there is a
solution for the long-run stock of building society mortgages conditional on the stock of
deposits in building societies.  Meen’s equation for the rate of growth of building society
mortgages, estimated for 1963 to 1977, has a standard error of around 0.0026.
Wilcox (1985) follows a different approach.  He takes the average LVR for FTBs as an
indicator of mortgage rationing, following Kent (1980). The long-run solution for his
equation, estimated for quarterly data 1969-1983 on building society mortgages, given the
reported standard errors, can be parameterised as follows:
log (bsd/pdi) = constant +0.4*log real pdi -0.32*log abmr + log housing stock + 1.4 log LVR
where bsd is the stock of building society mortgages, pdi is personal disposable income, abmr
is the tax-adjusted mortgage interest rate, the housing stock is defined as housing wealth
scaled by the mix-adjusted house price index and LVR is the average for first-time buyers for
building societies.  The equation, estimated in equilibrium correction form, also contains
dynamic terms in log house prices, the interest rate and LVR and has a coefficient of –0.062
on log bsd(-1), measuring the speed of adjustment.  The equation standard error is 0.0029.
We have outlined the relevant variables in our equation for the total stock of mortgage debt in
Section 4.  The equation has the same general form as eq. 5.2, with the dependent variable
Dlog sd, where sd is the stock of mortgages held by the personal sector.  After extensive
reduction from a more general dynamic specification, we arrive at the model shown in Table
1b.  This has a speed of adjustment of 0.062, virtually the same as that estimated for building
societies by Wilcox (1985), and about one quarter of that corresponding to unsecured debt.
A key component is log income where, after testing, we impose a long-run coefficient of 1.
The long-run coefficient of the log housing wealth to income ratio is 0.58.  The long-run
coefficient on log abmr is -0.39, close to the estimate of Wilcox (1985).  The spread between
the credit card rate and the mortgage interest rate has a positive coefficient indicating that a
fall in the mortgage rate relative to the credit card rate encourages a switch from unsecured to
mortgage borrowing, other things being equal, though the effect is less significant than the
parallel effect in the unsecured debt equation.  However, the real rate of interest is not21
significant.  The implications are quite important: a decline in inflation, with the real rate
constant, reducing nominal rates and the ‘front-end loaded’ current debt service ratio, will
increase mortgage debt.  A decline in inflation, with no change in the nominal rate, and so a
rise in the real rate, leaves the mortgage debt to income ratio unchanged, even though future
debt service ratios are higher than with higher inflation.  One could argue that this finding
suggests that household suffer from an element of inflation illusion.  An alternative
interpretation is that low inflation is associated with lower risks of interest rate rises and of
income surprises, and that it this, which is encouraging households to carry heavier debt
burdens.  However, we have already controlled for at least part of this effect though our
volatility measures of inflation and interest rates.
The rate of mortgage possessions in the previous three years has a significant negative
coefficient.  The dynamics include the demographic change variable reflecting changes in
population in the key mortgage borrowing age groups, and the four-quarter changes in
consumer confidence and the unemployment rate.  However, a proxy for income growth
expectations, using the actual growth rate of income four quarters ahead, proved
insignificant, unlike in the unsecured debt equation, where it had been strongly significant.  It
seems that mortgage debt is less relevant for intertemporal consumption smoothing at a one-
year horizon than is unsecured debt.  Our measure of volatility of inflation and interest rates
and of interest rate expectations is significant, indicating that mortgage-borrowing is also
encouraged by a low volatility environment.
The equation includes seasonals, given the mortgage debt data are not seasonally adjusted,
implying that the second and third quarters experience greater mortgage growth.  A dummy
taking the form of +1 followed by -1 measures the advancement effect of Chancellor Nigel
Lawson’s announcement in March 1988 that multiple mortgage interest tax relief would be
withdrawn on August 1
st.  The long-run effect of the CCI on mortgage debt can be computed
by taking its peak value of 0.233 in 2000, multiplying by its long-run coefficient of 3.28.  The
implication is that about 0.76 of the rise in the log of unsecured debt from 1980 to 2000 can
be attributed to the rise in the CCI.  This corresponds to a 114 percent rise.
The equation standard error is 0.00281, without correcting for degrees of freedom.  Assuming
that 21 degrees of freedom are lost, from the 18 parameters in the function, plus another 3
apportioned to the contribution of that equation in the estimation of the CCI, gives a standard
error of 0.0031.
16  This is a little higher than that for Wilcox’s model, and even higher than
Meen’s equation, but since these covered only the more homogeneous building society
component of mortgages, this can be considered to be reasonable.
Tests for serial independence up to the 4th order and homoscedasticity of the residuals are all
satisfactory. A check on parameter stability is provided by the last two columns of Table 1b,
which shows the estimates over the 1976:1 to 1990:4 sample.  The asymptotic standard error
is slightly lower for the shorter sample, but correcting for degrees of freedom, it is higher. As
for the unsecured debt equation, the great majority of the parameters are under two standard
deviations from the full-sample estimates.
5.3  The equations for PLIR
                                                       
16  This suggests that the reported t-ratios in Table 1b should be scaled down by a factor 0.895 to
incorporate the degree of freedom correction.22
We know of no previous work modelling the proportion of high loan-to-income mortgages to
first-time buyers.  As noted above, we have data on PLIR, the proportion of FTBs with LIR
of 2.5 or over, classified by age (under/over 27) and region (North/South).  Our priors for the
economic influences on the PLIR equations were set out in detail in Section 3.3.  The
equation has the form
3
01 (()(())) tttt yfzfzfy ab - D=+-- (5.5)
where y is the log odds-ratio of PLIR, f(zt) is a linear function of the various drivers of y, and
f0  is the average across age and regions of the maximum observed value of y.  When f(zt) =
f0,   the long-run value of y is f0 ,  and near this value the non-linearity is unimportant.
However, with b positive, as f(zt) falls further and further below this value, the cubic term
becomes more and more negative, so that y falls below the value otherwise predicted by f(zt)
and yt-1.  Without this non-linearity, the model finds it slightly more difficult to capture the
low values of PLIR reached in 1980, before credit conditions eased, and at a time of high
interest rates and recession.  Otherwise, the type of curvature, implied by the log odds-ratio,
seems to capture well the behaviour of PLIR
The speed of adjustment a is estimated at 0.38.  The coefficient on the CCI is set to the value
10. Note that the CCI coefficient in one equation must be set, to achieve identification, given
that the parameters of the spline function, which governs the shape of the CCI are estimated.
The long-run coefficient on the log income/house price ratio is –2.08, though all the negative
income effect is offset by the coefficient of 2.65 on log real income, leaving a positive long-
run income effect.  The implication is that high real house prices tend to force up LIRs, as
argued in Section 3.3.  The log of the mortgage rate has a strong negative effect with a long-
run coefficient close to -1, suggesting that debt-service considerations are relevant for LIR
rules followed by lenders and probably for the borrowing motive.  But increases in mortgage
rates over the previous two years also have a strong negative effect on PLIR.  It is possible
that the effect being captured is not just on interest rate expectations, since changes in interest
rates tend to be positively auto-correlated, but perhaps also on economic conditions in the
labour and housing markets.  This may be why the change in the unemployment rate and
consumer confidence, relevant in the debt equation, prove to be insignificant here.  A risk
indicator defined as the eight-quarter average of negative housing returns is correctly signed
though not significant at the 5 percent level.  As discussed further below, the coefficient on
our other risk indicator, the 3-year moving average of the rate of mortgage possessions, is set
rather than estimated.
The effect of the ISMI dummy, representing the tightening of rules governing income support
for unemployed mortgage borrowers, has a negative coefficient, though completely
insignificant
17.  The dummy for the 1998 elimination of mortgage indemnity premia for
LVRs below 0.9 would be expected to have a larger effect in the PLVR equation.  Indeed, its
coefficient is negative but insignificant in the PLIR equation, and the term is omitted in this
specification.
                                                       
17  Note that the effect of the ISMI dummy, a step dummy 0 before 1995Q2 and 1 from 1985Q3,
is hard to distinguish from the effect of D96.  We have restricted D96 to zero.  We similarly
restrict D98 to zero, to improve identification of the mortgage indemnity pricing dummy.23
An important consideration when modelling mortgage data, which before 1992, reflects only
building societies, is the sample selection issue.  When the banks entered the mortgage
market in 1980, it is believed that they began by targeting existing current account customers,
who would previously have gone to building societies for mortgages.  They therefore will
have taken customers away from building societies who were, on average, more affluent,
with secure jobs, and with larger potential cash deposits.  This is likely to have pushed up the
proportion of building society customers with small cash deposits -  controlling for the
general easing of credit conditions - and so high LVRs, but lowered the proportion of
building society customers with high LIRs. Banks are likely to have given higher LIRs to
their own current account customers with secure jobs and a satisfactory banking and credit
record.  Figures 5 and 6 confirm that PLIR for building societies rose at the time.  However,
it is likely that PLIR for building societies and banks together, rose by even more.  From
1983, data are available on average loans advanced by banks and building societies.  The data
show average bank loans to be around 30 percent higher than building society loans in 1983-
5, but declining to be close to the level of building societies by 1990. For 1980-82, we
assume bank advances to be 40 percent higher.  We define our proxy for the sample selection
bias to be (average bank advance/average building society advance –1)* annual change in the
share of banks in total mortgages outstanding, and zero after 1990, when banks and building
societies have very similar lending profiles.  The change in the share of banks is a proxy for
the volume of new advances to FTBs by banks relative to building societies, which is not
available.  Table 1c confirms a significant negative coefficient for this variable in the PLIR
equation.
The sample selection bias for centralised mortgage lenders is also likely to have been
important.  These entered the market from 1985, obtaining access to customers through
financial advisers, estate agents and others because they did not have an established presence
on the U.K.’s high streets.  Their subsequent mortgage possessions rates were around three
times as high as those of the building societies, see Ford (1994), suggesting a riskier lending
profile, and hence probably a higher proportion of high LIR and high LVR loans.  As they
gained market share, the proportion of high LIR and high LVR loans by building societies
would have declined - controlling for the general easing of credit conditions. Indeed, the
annual change in the share of centralised mortgage lenders in total mortgages outstanding has
a negative effect in the PLIR equations, though significant only at the 90 percent level.
There are some symptoms of negative first-order residual autocorrelation and of
heteroscedastic residuals.  The latter can be traced largely to large residuals in 1980, when the
proportion of high LVR loans fell to the lowest level in the sample.  Our reported parameter
estimates do not incorporate a correction for these features, but it would be desirable to do so.
A check on parameter stability is provided by the last two columns of Table 1b, which show
the estimates over the 1975:4 to 1990:4 sample.  The standard error is higher for the shorter
sample and, as for the unsecured debt equation, the great majority of the estimated parameters
are under two standard deviations from the full-sample estimates.
5.4  The equations for PLVR
The only previous work modelling the proportion of high LVR loans, of which we know, is
Muellbauer (1997), though Wilcox (1985) and Muellbauer and Murphy (1993) had modelled24
the average LVR for FTBs 
18.  Muellbauer analyses annual data, on the 11 U.K. regions, for
PLVR for 1971-1995, extrapolating missing PLVR data for 1971-3 from average regional
LVR data and a simple econometric model.  Estimating a model, incorporating a CCI,
confirms most of the priors regarding PLVR set out in section 3.4.  The equation has the
form,
tt-1itt (9.0) log (PLVR/(1-PLVR)) = 0.33* log (PLVR/(1-PLVR)) -0.083*log (hp/pc )
t (6.1)(6.1)(12.7)(4.9)(2.8)
+0.33*log0.16*log1.88*0.48*log0.08*(Gallup/100) itititit ryhpabmrpc D-D-+D+D
(6.5)(2.3) -0.15*arorse**t-1 +0.12*rorsem**t-1                          (5.6)
Here, hp refers to the house price in the ith region, pc is the consumer expenditure deflator
for the U.K., ry is real regional non-property income, abmr is the tax-adjusted mortgage
interest rate using the ith region tax adjustment, Gallup is the Gallup Poll measure of
consumer confidence in December of the previous year, and arorse** and rorsem** are risk
factors defined further below.  Absolute values of t-ratios are shown in parentheses.
Thus, the log real house price index and its nominal rate of change have negative coefficients;
the growth rate of income has a positive coefficient; the nominal interest rate has a negative
coefficient, while inflation has a positive effect, suggesting an element of real as well as
nominal interest rate effects.  The annual change in an index of consumer confidence has a
positive coefficient, while two risk indicators based on the rate of return in housing in the
South East have the expected signs.
These indicators are defined as follows: let rorse be the rate of return in housing in the South
East, defined as Dlog hpse – abmr, where hpse is the official mix-adjusted house price for the
South East, including London, and abmr is the tax adjusted average mortgage rate for the
U.K. scaled by 100.  Let arorse be the absolute value of rorse and rorsem be zero if rorse is
positive and equal to rorse if rorse is negative.  Now define a Koyck lag by
t-1t-1t-2t-3 arorse** = arorse + 0.8*arorse + (0.8)2*arorse,  (5.7)
and a similar lag in rorsem.  These terms have respectively a negative coefficient, suggesting
that greater volatility of returns  dampens the proportion of high LVRs, and a positive
coefficient, suggesting that a recent history of negative returns also dampens high LVRs.
As is acknowledged in Muellbauer (1997), one defect of the estimated model is that it fails to
deal with the sample selection problem, so that the estimated CCI turns down temporarily in
1983 and 1987.
Turning to the current study, an equilibrium correction model for the log odds ratio of PLVR
was specified in a similar form to that for PLIR discussed above, and incorporates a similar
non-linearity through a cubic term, which, however, proved insignificant.  Again, there are
                                                       
18  Wilcox, however, does not control for market conditions, except through the ratio of building
society deposits to building society mortgages, a proxy for the societies’ liquidity.25
fixed effects by age and region.  The speed of adjustment at 0.54 is quite similar to that of the
PLIR equations.  The long-run CCI coefficient is estimated at 21.4 and is highly significant.
The coefficient on the log income/house price ratio is 0.55 and significant, consistent with the
posited negative real house price effect.  The rate of growth of house prices also has the
posited negative effect.  The log mortgage rate enters with a four-quarter moving average,
with a highly significant negative coefficient, and there is also a significant negative ‘shock’
effect of the current change in the mortgage rate, perhaps also forecasting further rises in
rates.  The real mortgage rate has a negative coefficient, but completely insignificant, and so
omitted here. The VOL term, which captures volatility of inflation and interest rates and
short-term interest rate expectations, is highly significant and its coefficient is about twice as
large as in the PLIR equations. The three-year moving average of the mortgage possessions
rate was relevant, as an indicator of perceived mortgage risk, in the two aggregate debt
equations.  It is also significant, with the expected negative coefficient, in the PLIR
equations.
The log ratio of aggregate unsecured debt to income in the previous quarter has a negative
coefficient, which we interpret as reflecting the greater ability to access unsecured debt, to
help fund housing purchase deposits, at least indirectly.  Note that, since this ratio depends
positively on the CCI with a long-run coefficient of 2.16, and enters here with a coefficient of
–2.34, the effect of the CCI from this source is around –5.   The long-run coefficient of CCI
in the PLVR equation is 21.4.  Combining the two effects, gives a net long-run effect of CCI
on PLVR of 16.4 rather than 21.4.
The step dummy for 1998Q1, which captures the abandonment of mortgage indemnity
insurance payments for those with LVRs below 0.9, has a strong negative coefficient.  As
expected, this pricing shift created an incentive for borrowers over this threshold to bring
their LVRs below 0.9, and so pushed down PLVR.  The 1995 ISMI dummy also has a
significant negative coefficient, reflecting the increased risks faced by borrowers, with the
tightening of income support for the unemployed with mortgage commitments.  The effect is
substantially larger than for the PLIR equations, for no obvious reasons.
As Figures 7 and 8 illustrate, PLVRs for older borrowers tend to be substantially lower than
for younger borrowers, while the PLIR differences are much less pronounced.  Clearly
younger borrowers have had less opportunity to save for a deposit.  From the early 1990s,
there has been a substantial rise in the average age of FTBs.
19 Since the under 27 category is
bounded by the age 27, the rise has been more noticeable in the over 27 age group.  One
would expect this to account for some of the downward drift in PLVRs in the second half of
the 1990s.  Indeed, when we enter the deviation in the average age of the over 27 group in
each quarter from the average over the whole sample, we find a significant negative
coefficient.
Finally, to turn to the sample selectivity proxies discussed in Section 5.3, the proxy for banks,
where the prior is unclear, is insignificant, but a negative coefficient for centralised mortgage
lenders is consistent with prior expectations.  Thus, when the downmarket centralised
mortgage lenders gained market share in the second half of the 1980s, this pulled down the
                                                       
19  It is noteworthy that ‘first-time buyer’ is defined as someone whose previous tenure was not
in owner-occupation.  Some in this category may therefore have had a spell as owner-
occupiers, returned to renting, before switching back, see Holmans (2001).26
PLVRs reported for building societies.  This effect is not enormous, however, and significant
only at the 90 percent level.
Tests for serial independence up to the 4th order and homoscedasticity of the residuals are all
satisfactory. A check on parameter stability is provided by the last two columns of Table 1d,
which shows the estimates over the 1976Q1 to 1990Q4 sample.  The standard error is higher
for the shorter sample and, as for the other debt equations, the great majority of the
parameters are under two standard deviations from the full-sample estimates.
5.5 The estimated VOL
To define inflation volatility, we first define  444 inf() ttt aabslpclpc - =D-D  where lpc is the
log of consumer expenditure deflator, and abs( ) indicates the absolute value.  Then, ainfma4t
+ 0.5 ainfma4t-4 defines inflation volatility, where ma4 is the 4-quarter moving average.  To
define interest rate volatility, we first define  4 (), tt albrabslbr =D  where lbr is the log of the
base rate.  Then albrma4t + 0.5 albrma4t-4 defines interest rate volatility.  One year ahead
interest rate expectations are measured by spread1t = yield on 1 year giltst-1 - brt, where br is










where the vi’s are parameters.  We also checked for longer lags in the 4-quarter moving
averages of volatility and for the 5 and 10 year spreads, but none of these were significant.
As noted above, the coefficient on VOL needs to be fixed for one equation to identify the
vi’s.  We fix the coefficient in the LIR equation at 10 so that we expect the vi’s to be negative.
The results are in Table 1e.  The most significant of the three terms is v1:  a fall in inflation
volatility has sizeable positive effects on both types of debt and on the proportion of high
LVRs and LIRs.  Our measures of interest rate volatility and of interest rate expectations are
of more marginal relevance.
5.6  The estimated CCI
Table 1f shows estimates of the parameters of the CCI function.  Note that the last quarter of
1980 marks the start of the rise in CCI, handled by a 4
th quarter dummy.  Otherwise,
piecewise linear splines, shifting in quarter one of each year, are used to model CCI.  These
are constructed by defining step dummies for each year, stepping from 0 to 1 in the first
quarter.  The 4-quarter moving average converts the step into a trend going from 0 at the end
of the previous quarter to 1 at the end of the current quarter, thenceforth remaining at 1.  We
estimate the coefficients on each of these terms, subject to the restriction that, in the 1980-89
and 1995-2000 periods, no negative reversals take place: such reversals can be ruled out
given the institutional background set out in Section 2. These restrictions imply a zero
coefficient in 1983.  As noted above, a zero restriction was also imposed on the coefficients
in 1996 and in 1998 to help identify the effects of ISMI (income support for mortgage
interest) and the MIP dummy (for the change in pricing of mortgage indemnity insurance).27
Without this restriction, the CCI would have risen in 1998, standing marginally higher in
2000.
To account for possible variations in CCI before 1980, we include the 4-quarter change of the
consumer credit controls dummy.  This is likely to reflect the stance of the authorities to
expansion of credit more generally.  Its coefficient is negative and significant.  We also
investigated the mortgage-rationing indicator, MRAT, from Meen (1995) for the period up to
1980 Q3, after which the CCI dummies begin to operate.  The coefficients are positive for the
current value and lags up to two quarters, and significantly so at a lag of one quarter.  This
suggests, perversely, that greater rationing is associated with higher values of debt growth
and looser ceiling on LVRs and LIRs. In our view, this casts some doubt on the short run
dynamics of Meen’s indicator, though it does show a fall at the end of 1980 and remains low,
indicating an easing of rationing. One other possibility, which we have not investigated, is to
use a liquidity ratio for building societies up to 1980Q3 for the same purpose.
Figure 9 graphs the estimated CCI, showing also the real tax-adjusted mortgage interest
rate
20.  As noted, the steepness of the fall between 1990 and 1993, and of the subsequent
recovery depends on the calibrated values of the possessions effects in the PLIR and PLVR
equations.  Thus, under other assumptions, we could have obtained a smaller fall and
subsequent rise than the one illustrated here.  Figure 9 also plots the CCI, which results when
the possessions coefficients are set to zero in the PLIR and PLVR equations.  As can be seen,
the fall between 1990 and 1993 is more pronounced, as is the subsequent recovery.
Otherwise, the overall shape of the CCIs is similar.
An important question concerns the downturn in the CCI from 1990, reaching a trough in
1993, before turning up again.  One might ask whether this is a genuine credit supply shift, or
reflects the risk perceptions and negative outlook on both sides of the market during this
period when mortgage possessions ran at the highest levels since records begin. We control
for risk perceptions as noted above, and the consumer confidence indicator and income
growth should control for economic conditions, but one cannot be entirely sure that these
controls are adequate.  The description of the evolution of credit conditions given in Section 1
suggests that the biggest source of a downward supply shift was the change in mortgage
indemnity insurance contracts available to lenders.  In the post-war period, there had never
before been a time of sustained falls in nominal house prices, and with hindsight, the insurers
had severely under-priced credit risk in the late 1980s.  However, the result of these
misperceptions was that, for given economic conditions, mortgage borrowers had had greater
access to credit in the 1987-89 period than in 1990-94.  For modelling consumption, house
prices, housing turnover and subsequent mortgage defaults, this does seem to point in the
right direction.
6.  Empirical results: interaction effects with the Credit
Conditions Index
                                                       
20  And so helping to explain, given the positive correlation in the early 1980s, why it is common
to find weak or perversely signed real interest rate effects in mortgage equations, which omit
a CCI effect.28
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 have outlined the economic variables impacting on loan-to-income and
loan-to-value ratios for first-time buyers, as represented by the eight series on PLIR and
PLVR, and Section 4 the economic variables acting on aggregate unsecured and mortgage
debt to income ratios.  As explained in Section 3.2, the effect of the altered credit supply
environment, linked to the institutional changes discussed in Section 1, is introduced in each
equation through the Credit Conditions Index, CCI, common to all ten equations.  In addition,
in the unsecured debt equation, we incorporate the ratio of the number of credit cards
outstanding to the number of adults, to capture changes in credit supply not reflected in CCI,
the latter being more tuned to the mortgage market.  In Section 5, we presented estimates of
this 10-equation model, in which the CCI enters as an additive effect in each equation
21.  We
now consider a range of interaction effects.
With more liberal credit conditions, housing collateral is likely to receive a larger weight in
the mortgage equation and liquid assets an even more negative one.  And since intertemporal
substitution should have been more important as a motive for borrowing, the real interest rate
and expected income growth should play a bigger role as CCI rises, see Aron & Muellbauer
(2000) for the parallel effects on consumption.   Meanwhile, income uncertainty should have
a less negative effect on debt and consumption as CCI rises, since with more liberal credit
availability, temporary income downturns can be managed by additional borrowing.
As far as the PLIR and PLVR equations are concerned, one might expect also that the real
interest rate and expected income growth should play a bigger role as CCI rises for similar
demand side reasons and because of lenders’ views on the ability of households to repay.  It
seems likely that the nominal interest rate would play a smaller role since, in a more liberal
credit regime, refinancing is likely to be easier as a possible escape route, to ease pressure on
cash flows when nominal rates rise.  As far as average house price/income ratios are
concerned, one might expect the negative effects in the PLVR equations to moderate
somewhat as CCI rises since, in a more liberal credit regime, lenders will have taken a more
relaxed attitude to the risk of house prices falling.  The effect on the PLIR equations is less
clear, a priori.
Extending the model to include these interaction effects is fairly straightforward.  Estimation
is more difficult, as the complexity of the model generates local peaks in the likelihood
function.  This is particularly so when the CCI interacts with an I(1) variable.  It is also
important to demean the variables whose interactions with the CCI are to be estimated, since
otherwise arbitrary shifts in the intercept roles of the CCI will take place.  In Table 2, we
present estimates of a model with interaction effects, after some insignificant terms have been
eliminated.
The unsecured debt equation alters little.  Income growth expectations were already
significant and the interaction with the CCI adds nothing.  Interacted with the CCI, the real
interest rate now has a marginal negative effect.  In the mortgage debt equations, however,
the changes are bigger, though even interacted with CCI, the real interest rate is still not
significant.  The mortgage risk proxy, the possessions rate, still has a negative coefficient, but
                                                       
21  This corresponds to a concept Hendry (1999) has termed ‘co-breaking’.  The CCI represents
the intercept-equivalent effect of the structural breaks associated with financial liberalisation.
When the effect is additive in each equation, then by taking a simple linear transformation of
pairs or other combinations of equations, it is possible to eliminate the effect of the structural
breaks.29
is not insignificant.  The interaction of the CCI with the change in the unemployment rate is
positive, reducing the negative impact of rising unemployment on mortgage debt.  This
suggests that great credit availability reduces the effect of income uncertainty on debt.  The
biggest effect, however, is the interaction of CCI with the log ratio of housing wealth to
liquid assets.  This implies that when CCI is zero, the point estimate of the long-run elasticity
of housing wealth on mortgage debt is 0.18.  At the CCI peak of 0.234, the point estimate has
risen to 0.86
In the PLIR equation, the interaction effect with CCI suggest a small reduction in the effect
of the income to house price ratio - though we had no prior on the direction of this effect.  As
expected, the composite nominal interest rate effect is reduced as CCI rises, while the
interaction with the real interest rate is negative.  This suggests that, as refinancing becomes
easier, the front-end-loading problem associated with a rise in nominal rates matters less, but
a rise in real rates matters more.  However, given that an income growth expectations effect
already appears, the extra effect when CCI rises is negligible.
In the PLVR equations, the interaction effect with CCI implies a roughly 40 percent
reduction in the log (income/house price) effect suggesting a reduced concern over future
house price falls.  As in the PLIR equations, the negative effect of nominal interest rates on
the proportion of high LVR loans shrinks somewhat as credit conditions ease, while the
negative real interest rate effect expands.  There is also a notable interaction of income
growth expectations with credit conditions, as theory predicts, though it is not very precisely
estimated.
The shape of the estimated CCI, estimated with the interaction effects discussed, is not very
different from the one coming from the base specification of Section 5.  Figure 10 plots the
two against each other.  The log-likelihood of the equation system improves by 22 when the
interaction effects are included and the goodness of fit of all the individual equations
improves, notably the mortgage equation, where the asymptotic equation standard error falls
from 0.00281 to 0.00253.
7.  Conclusions
We have estimated an index of non-price credit conditions facing households in the 1976-
2000 period.  The index was derived as a common factor in ten credit indicators subject to
broad priors, consistent with the historical account of financial deregulation and other
developments in Section 2.  Two of the ten credit indicators were aggregate unsecured debt
and mortgages (secured debt).  The remaining eight consisted of the fractions of high loan-to-
income and high loan-to-value mortgages for UK first-time house buyers split by age and
regions.  Around 1m individual observations from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders, and its
predecessor, were aggregated to produce the 832 data points in these eight indicators.  To
ensure that, as far as possible, our CCI is not subject to the criticism that it is endogenous, we
have tested for and included, where relevant, an exhaustive set of economic controls.
Working with such general specifications was only made feasible by careful consideration of
sign priors to ensure the estimation of meaningful relationships.  The economic controls
included nominal and real interest rates, a measure of interest rate expectations and of
inflation and interest rate volatility, mortgage risk indicators, house prices, income, income
growth expectations, the change in the unemployment rate, demography, consumer30
confidence, portfolio wealth components, proxies for sample selection bias and various
institutional features.
Effectively, by construction, our CCI should be independent of these controls. For a major
rise in CCI to be sustainable, rational lenders should either have priced in the possible risk
consequences, or be using better credit screening methods, or be able to offload the risks
more easily on other financial institutions perhaps because of more efficient system-wide risk
sharing, or be prepared to experience an increase in losses on their household lending
portfolios, or some combination of the above.  It is true, as we have seen, that real interest
rates on mortgage lending rose sharply in the early 1980s, paralleling the rise in the CCI, and
consistent with the first of these points.  Research by one of us, with Gavin Cameron, on
possessions rates for a large mortgage lender does suggest an improvement in the 1990s not
explicable by the distribution of  LVRs and changes in the economic environment.  The
increased use of securitisation of mortgage loans in recent years is a sign that risk sharing
may be more extensive than previously.  However, whether all lenders are fully rational is
questionable, see Herring(1999) for an analysis of herd behaviour and myopic tendencies of
banks.  Hoggarth and  Pain(2002), suggest that provisioning policy by UK banks has a
relatively short horizon, anticipating formal accounting write-offs by about two years.  Since
the latter lag behind loan losses, the horizon appears to be under two years. The fact that we
are unable to find any very significant real interest rate effects in any of our ten equations,
suggests that lenders, like borrowers, are fixed on short term cash debt-service ability. This
suggest systematic neglect of the longer term outlook for the debt service burden in an
economic environment, where real interest rates are likely stay relative high, but coinciding
with weak nominal income growth.
Be that as it may, major applications of the CCI will be in modelling aspects of personal
sector behaviour including consumption, the demand for money, the housing market and
mortgage default rates.  If it is argued that our CCI includes influences other than the supply-
side evolution of consumer credit conditions in the UK - perhaps some gradual evolution in
preferences regarding risk - which we have not controlled for, then the same influences will
be omitted from extant models of consumption etc.  The empirical usefulness of the CCI is
therefore not compromised.  And as long as the future evolution of the CCI is gradual, which
seems to have been the case in recent years, it will be extremely useful in producing
forecasting models.
The empirical literature on the effects of financial liberalization on U.K. consumption does
not always find significant or plausible effects. Despite some early successes, by
Bayoumi(1993a,b), Muellbauer and Murphy(1993),  Darby and Ireland (1994),  Caporale and
Williams (1997), and Sarno and Taylor(1998), more recently Fernandez-Corugedo and Price
(2002)
22 find no role for financial liberalisation, and Bandiera et al (2000) find mixed results
for a group of developing countries. Aron and Muellbauer (2000) suggest two reasons for
this: poor measurement of financial liberalization or of credit conditions indicators, and an
                                                       
22  Darby and Ireland found that the degree of financial liberalisation, measured by Muellbauer
and Murphy’s (1993) FLIB indicator had a significant role in a forward-looking consumption
function for the United Kingdom estimated over the period 1969 Q1 to 1990 Q2.  Caporale
and Williams use the same methodology as Darby and Ireland at extending their sample to
1995 Q4 and find that FLIB continues to explain consumption behaviour. Fernandez-
Corugedo and Price (2002) extend the sample to 1998 Q4 but find that FLIB does not help to
explain consumption behaviour in the United Kingdom.31
inappropriate empirical model, particularly differencing data, as in Euler equations, so
removing long-run information. They argue that the CCI has three effects in a consumption
function: an intercept effect, an interaction effect with housing wealth, and interaction effects
with uncertainty, growth expectations and the real interest rate. They estimate a credit
conditions index, using institutional priors, from a two-equation debt and consumption
system.  Their results suggest that in South Africa, beginning in 1983, credit conditions for
consumers were liberalized progressively and that this played a major role in explaining rises
in debt to income and consumption to income ratios, despite the absence of any house price
boom in this period.
If similar results are obtained for the U.K., we can expect a faster speed of adjustment and
more sensible and precise estimates of interest rate and wealth effects, including lower
housing wealth effects, than in current U.K. consumption functions
23.
As far as the interpretation of recent conditions is concerned, in recent years the percentage of
loan-to-value ratios of 0.9 or over and of loan-to-income ratios of 2.5 or over appear to have
been at relatively moderate levels. One of the most striking implications of our findings is
that this may give too reassuring an impression of the exposure both of households and of
mortgage lenders to risk. Garratt and Panel (2001) address the related issue of whether credit
standards have again fallen by marshalling evidence from the SML.  They note the downward
drift in the proportion of high LVR loans and the moderate rise in aggregate
mortgage/income ratios, though there is some upward drift in high loan-to-income loans,
particularly in London in 1997- 2000.  However, they acknowledge the lack of household
data on unsecured lending, which by 2000 had reached twice the ratio relative to GDP
attained in the late 1980s.  This leaves some concerns that households and lenders with both
mortgage and unsecured loan books might be exposed to a down-turn in the economic
environment, for example, caused by a fall in the exchange rate and a subsequent rise in
interest rates.
Our econometric evidence is that an index of credit supply conditions, is indeed at an all-time
peak.  And note that we have controlled for the effects of low nominal interest rates and the
low inflation and interest rate uncertainty environment of recent years, as well as for other
features of economic conditions.  Moreover, we have evidence that borrowers have been
substituting unsecured debt for mortgage debt at the margin, to bring down loan-to-value
ratios to levels below 0.9, where mortgage loan terms are more favourable.  However, given a
relatively benign view of interest rate prospects, as well as changes in the composition of
first-time buyers, and probably, improvement in credit scoring methods
24, it seems unlikely
that the underlying situation is as risky as it was in 1988-9. Between 1988 and 1990, the base
rate rose from a trough of 7½ percent to 15 percent.  A rise from 4 percent to 8 percent, the
current equivalent, appears a remote possibility, particularly in the context of weak global
demand conditions.
                                                       
23  Earlier work by Muellbauer and Murphy (1993) incorporated interaction effects but not the
intercept role of a credit conditions index.
24  Unpublished research (Cameron and Muellbauer) for a large lender on possessions data by
vintage of loan is consistent with a significant improvement in lending quality in the 1990s.32
Data Appendix
The following appendix explains how our data set was constructed.
A.  National data
•  Non-property income (LY).  These series are nominal and seasonally adjusted. Its construction is
based on the guidelines produced in the Medium Term Macro Model by the Bank of England,
pages 58 and 62. More specifically the formula to construct the series is given by the following
ONS series: (rpqk-royl+royt-nrjn+royh) where rpqk denotes total disposable income, royl is
property income received, royt is property income paid, nrjn is households gross operating surplus
including gross mixed income and royh is mixed income. Effectively, LY is personal disposable
income (pdi) minus pre-tax property income (propy). However, pdi  - (1-tp)* propy would have
been more appropriate, where tp is the unobserved tax rate on property income.  Thus, if npdi is
the desired measure of personal disposable non-property income,
log npdi @ log LY  + tp*propy/LY.
We do not have good estimates of tp and take a proxy for tp to be 0.5*(total direct taxes paid by
households/personal income).  Since part of property income is untaxed imputed rent and since
other parts of interest income are untaxed, it seems likely the tax rate on property income is lower
than the average tax rate on all income, hence the 0.5 factor. It seems likely that this is closer to
the true value than the value of zero, implicitly assumed by the Bank.
•  Unsecured debt (UD).  These series, defined as consumer credit, come from the Bank of
England’s Monetary and Financial Statistics publication, code vzri in Table 6.1. Because the
series are only available from 1987 we spliced them to 1975 using the consumer credit series
analysed by Chrystal and Mizen(2001). The series are nominal and seasonally adjusted.
•   Secured debt (SD).  These series come from the ONS code amwt (see Financial Statistics, Table
3.2). The data are nominal and not seasonally adjusted.
•  Consumer confidence.  These series come from GfK, and represent the total balance, that is the
sum of the percentage of positive responses minus that of negative responses, adding personal
confidence about one’s own finances and also confidence about the economy.
•  Liquid Assets .  These are defined as nnmp.q+nnmy.q, the sum of currency and deposits plus
securities other than shares and are nominal and not seasonally adjusted (see table AA64 in
Economic Accounts for more).  Prior to 1987, the equivalent series are given by the old ONS
codes aldo-rewg-amwv-aqhg-reyx-akui-aldj-rhht-amxf-rraq.
•  Illiquid Financial Assets.  Defined as the difference between total financial assets (definitions
aldo.q (old ONS code) and nnml.q (new ONS code found in table AA64) in Economic Accounts)
and liquid assets (defined above). The series are nominal and in current prices.
•  Housing Wealth.  Housing wealth is constructed by Bank staff and is nominal and seasonally
adjusted.  The end-of-year figures coincide with ONS data from the personal sector balance
sheets.
•  Price deflator (PC).  This is the consumer price deflator obtained by dividing nominal by real
consumption from the ONS.
•  Unemployment rate.  These series comes from Labour Market Statistics.
•  The after tax mortgage rate.  Series constructed by housing market analysts at the Bank of
England.  They build in a tax adjustment based on Inland Revenue estimates of the cost of
mortgage interest tax relief.33
•  Population of working age.  These series come from the ONS’s Monthly Digest of Statistics and
Labour Trends.
•  The minimum lending rate.
•  Hire purchase controls measure.  This measure was used in the HM Treasury models of the 1980s.
•  The change in demographic demand component.  These series are defined as in Muellbauer and
Murphy 1997.  They apply SML fractions of new mortgages accounted for by different age
groups to the population growth rates of each age group.
•  The number of credit cards divided by the population of working age (CREDO).  The number of
credit cards in circulation come from the British Banking Association.
•  Rate of return in housing.  It is defined as the yearly change in house prices minus the after tax
mortgage rate plus 0.02, an estimate of imputed rent minus taxes and maintenance costs as a
proportion of the value of a dwelling.
•  Demutualisation dummy.  This is a dummy for expected windfalls from  demutualisation of
building societies in 1995 and takes the value 1 in 1995Q1.
•     Mortgage Indemnity Premium Dummy. Step dummy for abolition of the premium from 1998Q1.
•  Lawson dummy.  Dummy for 1988’s budget announcement that multiple tax relief would be
abolished on August 1
st, and restricted to one relief per property.  The dummy is 0.25 in 1988Q2
and 1 in 1988Q3, and otherwise zero.
•  Possessions . The series comes from CML’s housing finance. They are the annual number of
possessions divided by the number of mortgages outstanding.
•  House prices (HP). Series from the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions.
B.  Regional data
We first briefly define the main sources for our regional data, the Survey of Mortgage Lenders and the
New Earnings Survey and then describe the data series in some detail.
B1. Data extracted from SBSM/SML
B1.1. Characteristics of SBSM/SML
The Survey of Building Society Mortgages (SBSM) and Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML) were
originally commissioned by Department of the Environment to construct a mix-adjusted house price
series. These surveys are available in electronic format for the years 1975 to 2000 from the Data
Archive at the University of Essex. Unfortunately, the year 1978 is missing and, though the data are in
the archives of the Dept. of the Environment, Local Government, Transport and the Regions, they
were unwilling to release it to us.
A structural break occurs in the surveys in 1992 Q2.  Prior to that date, the survey only included
Building Societies (the Abbey National being the exception as it is included after it became a Bank in
1988).  The transformation of the Abbey National to a bank prompted the creation of the Council of
Mortgage Lenders (CML) in June 1989.  This led to the modification, in 1992 Q2, of the SBSM to
accommodate all members of the CML, not only Building Societies.
The surveys correspond to the response of 5 percent of all loans granted (by Building Societies prior
to 1992 Q2 and by all lenders thereafter).  The questionnaire provides detailed information on the
following characteristics:34
•  the loan amount,
•  the price of the house at completion,
•  the income of the borrower(s),
•  the age of the borrower(s),
•  the region where the house was purchased,
•  the previous tenure of the borrower(s) (whether it is a first-time buyer, or an owner-occupier),
•  whether price discounts were obtained (through right to buy schemes),
•  the interest rate on the mortgage,
•  the length of the mortgage,
•  the number of borrowers (prior to 1983 the electronic records do not permit extraction of the
number of borrowers),
•  the sex of the borrowers,
•  the type of the dwelling (such as a detached, semidetached, bungalow, etc)
•  number of rooms.
B1.2. Variables extracted
From the SBSM/SML we obtained the quarterly series:
a)  proportion of loan to value ratios in excess of 90 percent (PLVR)
b)  proportion of loan to income ratios in excess of 2.5 (PLIR)
c)  after tax mortgage interest rate
These series correspond to first time buyers only and exclude those receiving price discounts or those
under the right to buy scheme.  Moreover, each of these variables is constructed by region and age
group (see below for more).  These three series are derived after taking the following steps:
1)  We first omit observations where relevant data are missing (such as age, income, house price, or
information about price discounts or the previous tenure of the household).
2)  We discard local authority and housing association tenants buying a house with a price discount.
3)  We omit all sitting tenants not covered under 2).
4)  We split the data into two age categories, those under 27 and those aged 27 and over.
5)  We further split the data into those living in the South (defined as the regions Greater London,
South East, South West and East Anglia) and the North (the rest of UK regions).
6)  From this sub-sample of the data set, we construct PLVR, PLIR and the after tax mortgage rate.
The loan to value ratio is defined as the amount advanced by the lender divided by the house price.
The loan to income ratio is defined as the advance granted by the lender divided by the income or
incomes of the borrowers (where appropriate).
The derivation of the after-tax mortgage rate is given by the following formula:35
abmr=(x*bmr*(1-t)+(advance-x)*bmr)/advance
where x is the amount of the loan for which the tax discount is applicable (eg there was a maximum of
25000 from 1974 to 1983 and 30000 from 1983), bmr is the interest rate paid on the mortgage,
advance relates to the advance made by the lending institution, and t is the appropriate tax rate for
each individual (from 1991-93 it is just 25 percent, 20 percent in 1994, 15 percent from 1995, 10
percent from 1998 and zero from 2000).
B2. Extraction of NES data
The New Earnings Survey (NES) is an annual survey based on national insurance records providing
comprehensive information about earnings and hours data each April.  From an electronic file for
1975 to 2001, data were extracted on weekly earnings for full-time manual and non-manual men, and
for women workers by age and region (North/South). The data in the electronic file are more complete
than the data published each year in the annual reports of the NES.
B3. Regional income variable from NES, SBSM/SML; regional house prices
Construction of the Divisia index for regional income by age is done in the following steps:
1)  Using the earnings data from the NES, we aggregate non-manual and manual men for each age
and region using the following formula:
0.75*non-manual earnings + 0.25*manual earnings to give men's earnings.
i
2)  For each age and region we construct couple's earnings as
0.5*(men's earnings + women's earnings).
3)  From 1983 onwards we have weights for each age and region of single men, single women and
couples. These weights are obtained the SBSM/SML data sets and only include first time buyers
and exclude individuals who have a price discount (see above).
4)  We assume that the pre-1983 weights for males, females and couples are the same as the 1983
weights.
5)  The average annual earnings index for each region and age is constructed as follows:
average earnings = (female weight * female earnings) + (couple weight * couple earnings) +
(male weight * male earnings)
6)  We then construct the Divisia index using the previous year's weights across the 3 types of buyers
- single men, single women and couples- making sure these weights add to one.  We do this for
each of the regions and age groups. The index is benchmarked to 1986.
7)  To obtain quarterly series, we interpolate the data using the monthly average earnings index for
Great Britain.
Regional house price data came from the mix-adjusted series published by the Dept. of Local
Government, Transport and the Regions.  These indices are scaled to the average value of first-time
buyers’ dwellings in 1995.36
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percentage of FTBs with loan-to-income ratios of 2.5 or more (PLIR)
percentage of FTBs with loan-to-value ratios of 0.9 or more (PLVR)
Credit Conditions Index (CCI)
income support for mortgage interest (ISMI)
inflation and interest rate volatility and expectations (VOL)39
Table 1a: Parameter estimates for the log change in unsecured
 log UD
Sample 1976Q1-2000Q4 Sample 1976Q1- 1990Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio Coefficient
speed of adjustment 0.268 10.2 0.224
Intercept -0.053 0.2 -0.802
CCI 2.16 4.9 2.48
income growth (+4) 0.490 3.5 1.052
Spread -1.19 5.9 -1.12
Demutualisation dummy 0.152 6.4 -
MIP dummy 0.078 5.3 -
log real income 0.367 2.5 0.811
D4 log base rate -0.025 2.0 -0.020
rate of return housing 0.258 4.1 0.372
Asymmetric housing risk 0.359 3.3 0.063
log liquid assets (-1)/income -0.570 3.1 -0.568
log illiquid financial assets (-1)/income 0.068 1.6 0.180
log housing assets (-1)/income 0.004 0.1 0.065
log proportion of credit cards (-2) 0.179 4.0 0.097
rate of possessions ma12 -0.080 4.3 -0.268
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 3.217 3.6 4.632
Std. Error of regression 0.00585 0.00616
R-squared 0.900 0.812
LM heteroscedasticity test 2.78 [P=0.096] 3.66 [P=0.056]
Durbin-Watson 2.18 2.31
LM AR4 test F=0.87 [P=0.48]40
Table 1b: Parameter estimates for the log change in secured (mortgage) debt, Dlog sd
Sample 1976Q1-2000Q4 Sample 1976Q1- 1990Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio Coefficient
speed of adjustment 0.062 6.6 0.041
Intercept 2.208 2.2 5.17
Credit Conditions Index 3.263 4.4 5.61
Spread 0.918 2.2 1.23
seasonal 1 -0.064 4.6 -0.121
seasonal 2 0.019 1.6 0.058
seasonal 3 0.045 3.3 0.074
Lawson dummy 0.263 4.2 0.331
log adjusted mortgage interest rate -0.394 4.4 -0.617
D4 consumer confidence index 0.00155 2.8 0.0099
D4 unemployment rate -0.023 3.3 -0.005
log liquid assets (-1)/income -1.33 3.2 -2.30
log illiquid financial assets(-1)/income 0.076 1.0 -0.173
log housing assets(-1)/income 0.576 5.8 0.483
D ldemography 11.7 2.9 -
ISMI dummy(-1)             -0.175 3.4 -
rate of possession ma12 -0.129 2.3 -
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 2.85 2.7 12.9
Std. error of regression 0.00281 0.00265
R-squared  0.961 0.865
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.13 [P=0.72] 0.63 [P=0.43]
Durbin-Watson  1.79 1.82
LM AR4 test F=0.47 [P=0.75] 1.8241
Table 1c: Parameter estimates of log odds ratio of PLIR (proportion of loan-to-income for FTBs of 2.5 or more)
Sample 1976Q1-2000Q4 Sample 1976Q1- 1990Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio Coefficient
speed of adjustment                 0.382              13.6             0.355               11.7
Intercept for NY -24.3 6.8 -31.780
Intercept NO -24.6 6.6 -32.423
Intercept SY -23.7 6.5 -31.411
Intercept SO -24.0 6.3 -31.780
CCI 10 (fixed) - 10 (fixed)
share of couples -0.640 2.2            -0.903
log income/HP -2.08 9.3 -1.95
log UD (-1)/income -2.34 6.8 -2.28
log mortgage rate -0.892 5.0 -1.25                4.5
D4 log mortgage rate -0.564 2.7 -0.04
D4 log mortgage rate(-4) -0.380 3.2 -0.18
log real income 2.65 7.9 3.51
Income growth (+4) 1.24 1.9 1.83
Negative rate of return ma8 0.691 1.8 -
ISMI dummy(-1) -0.150 1.2                -
Sample selection banks -0.215 4.8 -0.159
Sample selection cent. lenders -0.081 1.9 -0.096
Rate of possessions ma12 -0.43 2.9 0 (fixed)
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 10 (fixed) - 10 (fixed
Std. error of regression 0.136 0.147
R-squared 0.972 0.952
LM heteroscedasticity test 11.9 [P=0.001] 10.8 [0.001]
Durbin-Watson 2.55 2.75
North, Young
LM AR4 test F=2.11 [P=0.86]
Std. error of regression 0.154 0.179
R-squared 0.971 0.953
LM het. Test 36.3 [P=0.000] 23.4 [P=0.000]
Durbin-Watson 2.62 2.6742
LM AR4 test F=4.14 [P=0.004]
Std. error of regression 0.138 0.145
R-squared 0.973 0.972
LM het. Test 5.6 [P=0.18] 4.3 [P=0.037]
Durbin-Watson 2.15 2.04
South, Young
LM AR4 test F=0.96 [P=0.43]
Std. error of regression 0.125 0.147
R-squared 0.977 0.973
LM het. Test 27.0 [P=0.000] 17.0 [P=0.000]
Durbin-Watson 2.56 2.62
LM AR4 test F=2.30 [P=0.064]43
Table 1d: Parameter estimates for log odds ratio of PLVR (proportion of loan-to-value for FTBs of 0.9 or more)
Sample 1976Q1-2000Q4 Sample 1976Q1- 1990Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio Coefficient
speed of adjustment 0.544                15.9            0.440                11.0
Intercept for NY -1.503 1.5 -0.447
Intercept for NO -2.31 2.2 -1.168
Intercept for SY -1.97 1.9 -2.616
Intercept for SO -2.81 2.6 -1.179
CCI 21.4 6.2 22.7
log income/HP 0.553 2.8 0.320
log UD(-1)/income -3.11 5.1 -2.354
log mortgage rate ma4 -1.22 6.3 -0.977
D log mortgage rate -1.12 3.8 -0.153
D4 log HP -0.876 3.0 -0.98
ISMI dummy(-1) -0.660                4.0 -
MIP dummy ma2 -0.190 2.8 -
Sample selection banks -0.033 0.5 -0.15
Sample selection cent. lenders             -0.092 1.7 -0.095
age deviation for old -0.0355 4.1 -0.044
Rate of possessions ma12 -0.49 2.5 0 (fixed)
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 24.1 4.3 42.5
Std. error of regression 0.125 0.117
R-squared 0.989 0.986
LM heteroscedasticity test 1.70 [P=0.19] 0.04 [P=0.84]
Durbin-Watson 1.80 1.60
North, Young
LM AR4 test F=0.40 [P=0.81]
Std. error of regression 0.117 0.142
R-squared 0.973 0.971
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.03 [P=0.87] 4.1 [P=0.043]
Durbin-Watson 1.68 1.57
LM AR4 test F=1.94 [P=0.11]
South, Young Std. error of regression 0.120 0.13044
R-squared 0.977 0.979
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.03 [P=0.87] 0.37 [P=0.54]
Durbin-Watson 1.92 1.68
LM AR4 test F=0.47 [P=0.76]
Std. error of regression 0.148 0.180
R-squared 0.962 0.952
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.19 [P=0.66] 0.37
Durbin-Watson 1.77 1.65
LM AR4 test 1.81 [P=0.14]45
Table 1e: Parameter estimates for interest rate volatility and expectations
Sample 1976Q1-2000Q4 Sample 1976Q1- 1990Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio Coefficient
Inflation volatility -0.685 4.1 -0.426
Interest rate volatility -0.024 2.2 -0.017
1 year gilt yield minus base rate -0.00062                2.0 -0.390
Note:    VOL= [v1*(inflation vol ma4+0.5*ma4(-4)) + v2*(log base rate vol ma4 +0.5*ma4(-4)) + v3*spread]46
Table 1f: Parameter estimates for CCI
Sample 1976Q1-2000Q4 Sample 1976Q1- 1990Q4


















 credit controls -0.00138 3.6 -0.00152
DumT is 4-quarter moving average of step dummy=0 before year T, and 1 from quarter 1 of year T.
Dum80Q4 is step dummy 0 up to 1980Q3, 1 thereafter.  CCI is the linear combination of coefficients and dummies.47
Table 2a: Parameter estimates for the log change in unsecured debt, D log UD
Sample 1976Q1- 2000Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio
speed of adjustment 0.286 10.3
Intercept -0.605 1.9
CCI 2.57 3.8
Income growth (+4) 0.574 4.2
Spread -0.943 5.0
Demutualisation dummy 0.137 6.2
MIP dummy 0.071 5.0
log real income 0.518 3.5
CCI* real base rate(-1) -0.041 2.0
D4  log base rate -0.008 0.6
rate of return in housing 0.215 3.6
Negative rate of return ma8 0.283 2.5
log liquid assets (-1)/income -0.504 3.0
log illiquid financial assets (-1)/income 0.064 1.6
log housing assets (-1)/income 0.090 1.9
log proportion credit cards (-2) 0.126 2.5
rate of possessions ma12 -0.104 5.4
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 9.22 1.2
Std. error of regression 0.00608
R-squared 0.894
LM heteroscedasticity test 2.04 [P=0.154]
Durbin-Watson 2.03
LM AR4 test F=0.09 [P=0.97]48
Table 2b: Parameter estimates for the log change in secured (mortgage) debt, Dlog sd
Sample 1976Q1- 2000Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio
Speed of adjustment 0.084 7.5
Intercept 2.32 4.3
Credit Conditions Index (CCI) 4.23 4.1
Spread 0.464 1.7
Seasonal 1 -0.047 5.1
Seasonal 2 0.019 2.3
Seasonal 3 0.037 4.1
Lawson dummy 0.190 4.9
log adjusted mortgage interest rate -0.286 4.8
D4  consumer confidence index 0.0083 2.0
D4  unemployment rate -0.022 2.2
CCI*D4 unemployment rate 0.111 1.4
log liquid assets (-1)/income -0.906 3.4
log illiquid fin assets (-1)/income 0.012 0.2
log hous. assets (-1)/income 0.165 1.2
CCI*log hous. assets (-1)/liq assets(-1) 2.83 2.7
D ldemography 6.78 2.3
ISMI dummy (-1) -0.101 2.8
rate of possession ma12 -0.022 0.5
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 8.33 1.2
Std. error of regression 0.00254
R-squared 0.968
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.02[P=0.879]
Durbin-Watson 1.96
LM AR4 test F=0.42 [P=0.79]49
Table 2c: Parameter estimates of log odds ratio of PLIR (proportion of loan-to-income for  FTBs of 2.5 or more)
Sample 1976Q1- 2000Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio
Speed of adjustment 0.412 14.3
Intercept for NY -5.54 0.7
Intercept NO -5.23 0.7
Intercept SY -4.59 0.6
Intercept SO -4.28 0.5
CCI 10 (fixed) -
Share of couples -1.56 4.1
log income/HP -2.80 8.4
CCI*log income/HP 3.21 2.7
log UD (-1)/income -0.961 2.2
log mortgage rate -1.72 5.4
D4  log mortgage rate -0.69 2.2
D4  log mortgage rate(-4) -0.52 3.0
CCI*composite mortgage rate -3.30 3.2
CCI*real mortgage rate(-1) -0.411 2.1
log real income 1.20 1.8
Income growth (+4) 0.94 1.1
Negative rate of housing return ma8 0.659 1.8
ISMI dum(-1) -0.253 2.5
Sample selection banks -0.172 3.9
Sample selection centralised lenders -0.102 2.4
rate of possessions ma12 -0.43(fixed) -
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 10 (fixed) -
North, Young Std. error of regression 0.132
R-squared 0.974
LM heteroscedasticity test 13.3 [0.000]
Durbin-Watson 2.54
LM AR4 test F=1.90 [P=0.12]
Std. error of regression 0.15350
R-squared 0.972
LM heteroscedasticity test 33.2 [0.000]
Durbin-Watson 2.52
LM AR4 test F=2.49 [P=0.049]
South, Young Std. error of regression 0.133
R-squared 0.975
LM heteroscedasticity test 5.4 [0.020]
Durbin-Watson 2.11
LM AR4 test F=0.87 [P=0.49]
Std. error of regression 0.125
R-squared 0.978
LM heteroscedasticity test 30.6 [0.000]
Durbin-Watson 2.63
LM AR4 test F=2.79  [P=0.031]
Composite mortgage rate =(log mortgage rate*coeff + D4  log mortgage rate*coeff +D4  log mortgage rate(-4)*coeff)51
Table 2d: Parameter estimates for log odds ratio of PLVR (proportion of loan-to-value for  FTBs of 0.9 or more)
Sample 1976Q1- 2000Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio
speed of adjustment 0.547 15.7
Intercept for NY -0.182 -0.1
Intercept for NO -0.182 -0.1
Intercept for SY -2.159 2.1
Intercept for SO -1.716 5.1
CCI 23.6 4.5
log income/HP 0.87 3.5
CCI*log income/HP -2.04 2.2
log UD(-1)/income -2.35 3.7
log mortgage rate ma4 -1.70 5.1
D log mortgage rate -1.93 4.4
CCI*composite mortgage rate -3.45 2.9
D4  log HP -0.339 1.8
CCI*income growth(+4) 7.75 0.9
ISMI dummy(-1) -0.76 2.5
MIP dummy ma -0.57 3.8
Sample selection banks -0.0004 0.1
Sample selection centralised lenders -0.125 2.4
age deviation for old -0.027 2.8
rate of possessions ma12 -0.49(fixed) -
VOL (volatility of inflation etc) 50.2 1.3
North, Young Std. error of regression 0.116
R-squared 0.981
LM heteroscedasticity test 1.84 [0.175]
Durbin-Watson 1.94
LM AR4 test F=0.05 [P=0.995]
Std. error of regression 0.119
R-squared 0.972
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.02 [0.876]52
Durbin-Watson 1.56
LM AR4 test F=2.99 [P=0.023]
South, Young Std. error of regression 0.117
R-squared 0.978
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.28 [0.59]
Durbin-Watson 1.99
LM AR4 test F=0.37 [P=0.81]
Std. error of regression 0.155
R-squared 0.959
LM heteroscedasticity test 0.04 [0.839]
Durbin-Watson 1.59
LM AR4 test F=2.81 [P=0.030]
Composite mortgage rate = (log mortgage rate ma4*coeff +D log mortgage rate*coeff)53
Parameter estimates for interest rate volatility and expectations
Sample 1976Q1- 2000Q4
Variable Coefficient Absolute t-ratio
Inflation volatility -0.260 1.2
log base rate volatility -0.015 1.2
Spread: 1yr gilt yield-base rate -0.00016 0.9
CCI interaction -3.74 3.1
Note:    VOL= [v1*(inflation vol ma4+0.5*ma4(-4)) + v2*(log base rate vol ma4 +0.5*ma4(-4)) + v3*spread]*
*CCI], where inflation and interest volatility and the spread have means for 1980Q4-2000Q4 subtracted.54
Table 2f: Parameter estimates for CCI
Sample 1976Q1- 2000Q4


















 credit controls -0.00067 2.4
DumT is 4-quarter moving average of step dummy=0 before year T, and 1 from quarter 1 of year T.
Dum80Q4 is step dummy 0 up to 1980Q3, 1 thereafter. CCI is the linear combination of coefficients and dummies.
                                                       
 The female category does not make the distinction between manual and non-manual workers.